For two-person dynamic zero-sum games (both discrete and continuous settings), we investigate the limit of value functions of finite horizon games with long run average cost as the time horizon tends to infinity and the limit of value functions of λ -discounted games as the discount tends to zero. We prove that the Dynamic Programming Principle for value functions directly leads to the Tauberian Theorem-that the existence of a uniform limit of the value functions for one of the families implies that the other one also uniformly converges to the same limit. No assumptions on strategies are necessary. To this end, we consider a mapping that takes each payoff to the corresponding value function and preserves the sub-and super-optimality principles (the Dynamic Programming Principle).
Introduction
Hardy proved (see, for example, [23, Sect. 6.8] ) that, for a bounded continuous function g , the limit of long run averages and the limit of discounted averages (Cesaro mean and Abel mean, [8, 18, 29] ).
Let us consider the analogs of this Tauberian theorem for asymptotics of optimal values in game-theoretic problem statements. What if we optimize the Abel mean and/or Cesaro mean and then consider the limit of the optimal values corresponding to them? Such a limit value (as the discount tends to zero) was first considered in [9] for a stochastic formulation. As proved in [7] , for a stochastic two-person game with a finite number of states and actions, optimal long-time averages and optimal discounted averages share the common limit. For more details on the limit value for Abel mean and/or Cesaro mean in other stochastic formulations, see [24, 32, 35, 42, 46, 48, 50] .
In the deterministic case, the question of existence of limit values arose in the control theory, time and again; one may at the very least note [12, 14, 20] . In the ergodic case (more generally, in the nonexpansive-like case) such limits exist and, moreover, they are usually independent of the initial state, which was demonstrated in [3, 6, 17] ; although the results were released roughly at the same time, the methods of obtaining them were thoroughly different. For the latest results on existence of limits of such values (for the nonexpansive-like case), see also [10, Sect. 3.4] , [11, 21, 34, 41] .
A Tauberian theorem (the equality of limit values) was proved for discrete time systems in [33] . The same result was obtained under an additional assumption that one of those limits is a constant function for control problems [2] and for differential games [1] . Note that, even in simple cases of control problems, the limits may not be constant functions [22, 41] . In the general (non-ergodic) case, a Tauberian theorem for very general dynamic systems was first proved in paper [40] . Then, in [26] , a Tauberian theorem was proposed for differential games (under Isaacs's condition). Later, in [49] , a very general approach to proving Tauberian theorems was proposed for games with two players with opposite goals in discrete setting.
In particular, it implies the same result for recursive games [35] . Note that, in addition to uniform and exponential payoff families, the Tauberian theorems can be formulated for arbitrary probability densities. The corresponding results are known for discrete time systems [38, 43] and for optimal control and games [27, 34, 50] .
The cornerstone of papers [26, 40] is the construction of near-optimal strategies for one of the averages by pieces of near-optimal strategies for another average. It requires some assumptions on players' strategies, in particular, the Dynamic Programming Principle; in addition, for games, there must be the existence of saddle point (see [26, 27] , and unpublished work [25] ).
Paper [49] exhibits a more subtle approach. In stochastic games, the value is a fixed point of the Shapley operator for the corresponding game. Parameterized (by the discount or the finite horizon) families of the corresponding Shapley operators were embedded into certain Lipschitz continuous families of nonexpansive operators, and the corresponding Tauberian theorem was proved for the fixed points of the latter operators.
The main aim of this paper is to obtain the Tauberian theorem as a direct consequence of [26, 27, 49] ) is required, although a reduction to the typical formalization will apparently require some of these.
We also apply this general theorem to zero-sum dynamic games in continuous and discrete settings and to differential games without a saddle point.
The structure of the paper is as follows. We start by formulating the Tauberian theorem for dynamic games in continuous setting (Theorem 1) in Sect. 2. Then, we consider the general statement: we define the concept of a game value map and formulate the Tauberian theorem for this map (Theorem 2) and the one-side inequalities on asymptotics (Propositions 1-4). Sect. 4
contains the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2. Sections 5 and 6 are devoted to the Tauberian theorem for games in discrete setting (Theorem 3) and for differential games (Theorem 4), respectively. Also, the Tauberian theorem for a very simple stochastic game model (Corollary 2) is shown in Sect. 5. The unwieldy and cumbersome proofs of propositions are confined to Appendix.
2 A dynamic zero-sum game Dynamic system. Set R + △ = R ≥0 . Assume the following items are given:
• a nonempty set Ω , the state space;
• a nonempty set K of maps from R + to Ω ;
• a running cost g : Ω → [0, 1] ; for each process z ∈ K , the map t → g(z(t)) is assumed to be Borel measurable.
On payoffs. Let us now define a time average v T (z) and a discount average w λ (z) for each process z ∈ K by the following rules:
Note that the definitions are valid, and the means lie within [0, 1].
On lower games. For all ω ∈ Ω , let there be given non-empty sets L(ω) and M(ω). Let, for all ω ∈ Ω , each pair (l, m) ∈ L(ω) × M(ω) of players' rules generate a unique process
The lower game is conducted in the following way: for a given ω ∈ Ω, the first player shows l ∈ L(ω) , and then, the second player chooses m ∈ M(ω) . The value function of this game is
For instance, for every T, λ > 0 , the payoffs v T , w λ generate the following value functions:
Let us say that the payoff family v T (T > 0) enjoys the Dynamic Programming Principle iff, for all T > 0 , the value function V T coincides with the value functions for the following payoffs:
Let us say that the payoff family w λ (λ > 0) enjoys the Dynamic Programming Principle iff, for all λ > 0 , the value function W λ coincides with the value functions for the following payoffs:
Theorem 1 Assume that the payoff families v T (T > 0) and w λ (λ > 0) enjoy the Dynamic Programming Principle.
Then, the following two statements are equivalent:
(ı) The family of functions V T (T > 0) converges uniformly on Ω as T ↑ ∞.
(ıı) The family of functions W λ (λ > 0) converges uniformly on Ω as λ ↓ 0 .
Moreover, when at least one of these statements holds, we have
For the proof of this theorem, refer to Sect. 4.
On abstract control systems. We can obtain the Tauberian theorem for an abstract control system. Following [40] , assume the sets Ω , K to be given; for all ω ∈ Ω , let L(ω)
be the set of all feasible processes z ∈ K that begin at ω . Let M(ω) be a singleton for all ω ∈ Ω .
Now, Theorem 1 implies
Corollary 1 Assume that the payoff families v T (T > 0) and w λ (λ > 0) enjoy the Dynamic Programming Principle.
In [40] , it is stated that the Tauberian theorem holds for an abstract control system if K is closed with respect to concatenation. This condition can be refined, see [28] .
Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 look similar to Tauberian theorems for dynamic zero-sum game and control system with continuous setting, respectively, in the most general statement. Nevertheless, let us sketch the examples when this similarity is misleading. In certain game problems with information discrimination, the second player has to choose m from M(ω, l) instead of from M(ω) [13] . 3 General statement.
On game value map. Let the sets Ω and K , running cost g , and payoffs v T , w λ be as before. Denote by U the set of all bounded maps from Ω to R ; denote by C a non-empty set of maps from K to R . Thereinafter, the set C incorporates all conceivable payoffs, and the set U contains all value functions for all games with payoffs c ∈ C.
Let C satisfy the following condition:
In this section, we also assume that v T , w λ ∈ C for all positive λ, T.
A map V from C to U is called a game value map if the following conditions hold:
On Dynamic Programming Principle. For all positive λ, T, h > 0 and every function
Definition 1 For a game value map V , let us say that a family of U T ∈ U(T > 0) is a subsolution a supersolution for the family of payoffs v T (T > 0) if, for every ε > 0 , there exists naturalT such that, for all natural h, T >T , the payoff ζ U T h,T lies in C and enjoys
For a game value map V , let us say that a family of U λ ∈ U(λ > 0) is a subsolution a supersolution for the family of payoffs w λ (λ > 0) if, for every ε > 0 , there exists naturalT such that, for all natural h >T and positive λ < 1/T , the payoff ξ U λ h,λ ∈ C lies in C and enjoys and, resp., V [w λ ] ) are, at the same time, a subsolution and a supersolution for this payoff family.
In particular, the family of payoffs v T (T > 0) (resp., w λ (λ > 0) ) enjoys the weak Dynamic Programming Principle if
Theorem 2 Let there be given a game value map V :
Assume that payoffs v T (T > 0) and payoffs w λ (λ > 0) enjoy the weak Dynamic Programming
Principle.
This theorem generalizes Theorem 1. For its proof, refer to Sect. 4.
One-sided Tauberian theorems for bounds from above. In Appendix B, we prove the following proposition:
Proposition 1 For a game value map V , let a family of functions U T ∈ U(T > 0) and the family of functions V [w λ ](λ > 0) be a subsolution for payoffs v T and a supersolution for payoffs w λ , respectively.
Then, for every ε > 0 , there exists a natural N such that
In Appendix C, we prove a similar proposition, where the payoff families are swapped:
Proposition 2 For a game value map V , let a family of functions U λ ∈ U(λ > 0) and the family of functions V [v T ](T > 0) be a subsolution for payoffs w λ and a supersolution for
The inequalities similar to ( 3a ) will be found in other Tauberian Theorems, (see [8, 
which holds for all game value maps from ( 8b ) , then Proposition 2 would fail for a certain game value map (see, for example, [40, Sect. 4 ] for control problems).
One-sided Tauberian theorems for bounds from below. Applying these propositions
Proposition 3 For a game value map V , let a family of functions U T ∈ U(T > 0) and the family of functions V [w λ ](λ > 0) be a supersolution for the payoffs v T and a subsolution for the payoffs w λ , respectively.
Proposition 4 For a game value map V , let a family of functions U λ ∈ U(λ > 0) and the family of functions V [v T ](T > 0) be a supersolution for the payoffs w λ and a subsolution for the payoffs v T , respectively.
For simplicity we could define C as the set of all bounded maps from K to R . It would be sufficient for proofs of all theorems of this article. We do not do it due to the following reasons. First, in stochastic frameworks, each payoff c has to be measurable with respect to some measurable space, see, for instance, Corollary 2 in Sect. 5. Secondly, all proofs use merely the boundedness of v T , w λ , and the additional requirement does not appear to help to obtain the bounds.
Also note that in the definitions of subsolution and supersolution, we consider only natural h and T . However, this strengthening is useless for continuous setting, whereas in discretetime setting it allows a direct usage of the corresponding Dynamic Programming Principle (see Section 5).
Proofs of main results
Proof of Theorem 2. Since the payoffs v T (T > 0) and the payoffs w λ (λ > 0) enjoy the weak Dynamic Programming Principle, we see that
simultaneously super-and subsolutions with respect to V for the payoffs v T and for the payoffs w λ respectively.
If at least one of the considered limits exists and is uniform in Ω, then, either the limit of
Assume that it is the limit of V [v T ] as T ↑ ∞. It follows that ( 3a ) and ( 3c ) hold for To finish the proof, we can now apply Theorem 2.
5 Tauberian theorem in discrete time setting On dynamics. Let there be given sets Ω , K and a running cost g , as before. Assume that we would like to consider any process as a function from {0, 1, 2, . . . } to Ω . Since, for such a function, its definition can be completed in the form
we can propose that this function is from R + to Ω and lies in K . Thus, in this section, we can assume that all z ∈ K satisfy ( 4 ) .
On payoffs. Recall that U is the set of all bounded maps from Ω to R . Let us consider a non-empty set C of maps from K to R and a game value map V : C → U satisfying conditions ( 2a ) and ( 2b ) , ( 2c ) , respectively.
For all µ ∈ (0, 1), n ∈ N , define payoffsv n : K → R,w µ : K → R as follows:
Also, assume thatv n ,w µ ∈ C for all µ ∈ (0, 1), n ∈ N .
On Dynamic Programming Principle. Let us say that the family of payoffsv n (n ∈ N)
enjoys the Dynamic Programming Principle iff, for all n, h ∈ N , the payof 
and each of these payoffs lies in C .
Theorem 3 Let all processes z ∈ K satisfy ( 4 ) . Let, for a game value map V : C → U , the payoff familiesv n (n ∈ N) andw µ (µ > 0) enjoy the Dynamic Programming Principle.
(ı) The sequence of functions V [v n ] (n ∈ N) converges uniformly on Ω as n ↑ ∞.
(ıı) The family of functions V [w µ ] (0 < µ < 1) converges uniformly on Ω as µ ↓ 0 .
Proof of Theorem 3. We will use estimate ( 8a ) and Lemma 1 proved in Appendix A.
Denote by C b the set of all bounded maps from K to R . We can assume C ⊂ C b ; otherwise, we would always use C ∩ C b instead of C. Now, by Lemma 1, we can set V [c] ∈ U for all c ∈ C b \ C such that conditions ( 2b ) -( 2c ) keep to hold. Thus, we obtain the game value map
Consider a function µ * : R >0 → (0, 1) defined as follows: µ * (λ) = 1 − e −λ for all λ > 0 .
Then,
implies w µ * (λ) ≡ w λ for all λ > 0 . Note that µ * (0+) = 0 + . Then, the limit of V [w µ ] as µ ↓ 0 exists and is uniform in Ω iff the limit of V [w λ ] as λ ↓ 0 exists and is uniform in Ω . Moreover, in this case, these limits coincide.
Also, it is easy to see thatv n ≡ v n for all n ∈ N. Since the payoffs v T (T > 0) are bounded, we have v T ∈ C b for all T > 0. For each T > 0 , we can choose n ∈ N such that T ∈ (n−1, n] , hence, we obtain
Thus, the limit of V [v T ] as T ↑ ∞ exists and is uniform in Ω iff the limit of V [v n ] as n → ∞ exists and is uniform in Ω . Moreover, in this case, these limits coincide.
At last, thanks to ( 4 ) andw µ * (λ) ≡ w λ ,v n ≡ v n for all n ∈ N, λ > 0, we have that, for all natural T = n, h ∈ N and positive λ, payoffs ( 5a ) and ( 5b ) coincide with ζ
, respectively. Therefore, the payoff families w λ (λ > 0) and v T (T > 0) enjoy the weak Dynamic Programming Principle.
We have verified all conditions of Theorem 2. Moreover, the corresponding limits in Theorem 2 and in Theorem 3 exist and are uniform in ω ∈ Ω only simultaneously. Thanks to Theorem 2, Theorem 3 is proved.
Let us showcase the application of this approach in a stochastic framework.
Consider a σ -algebra A on K . Assume that C A is the set of all A -measurable bounded maps of K to R . It is easy to see that C A satisfies the condition ( 2a ) .
Similarly to Section 2, for all ω ∈ Ω , let there be given non-empty sets L(ω) and M(ω) .
Let, for all ω ∈ Ω , each pair (l, m) ∈ L(ω) × M(ω) of players' rules induce a probability distribution P ω lm (over (K, A) ) along with its mathematical expectation E ω lm . Similarly to ( 1 ) , define the map W : C A → U by the following rule: for each c ∈ C ,
Evidently, W : C → U satisfies conditions ( 2b ) , ( 2c ) . Thus, W is a game value map.
Applying Theorem 3 for this game value map W, we obtain Corollary 2 Let all processes z ∈ K satisfy ( 4 ) . Also, assume that for all µ ∈ (0, 1) , n ∈ N the payoffsv n ,w µ are A -measurable.
Let, for the game value map W : C → U (see ( 6 ) ), the payoff familiesv n (n ∈ N) and w µ (0 < µ < 1) enjoy the Dynamic Programming Principle.
E ω lmv n converge uniformly on Ω as n ↑ ∞.
6 Differential games without saddle point.
Dynamic equation. Consider a nonlinear system in R m controlled by two players,
here, A and B are non-empty compact subsets of finite-dimensional Euclidean spaces.
In this section, we assume that
2. these functions are Lipschitz continuous in the state variable, namely, for a constant
Denote by B(R + , A) and by B(R + , B) the sets of all Borel measurable functions R + ∋ t → a(t) ∈ A and R + ∋ t → b(t) ∈ B , respectively. Now, for each pair (a, b) ∈ B(R + , A) × B(R + , B) , for every initial condition x(0) = x * , system ( 7 ) generates the unique solution x(·) = y(·; x * , a, b) defined for the whole R + . Denote by Y (x * ) the set of all such solutions with x(0) = x * .
Consider a set X ⊂ R m that is strongly invariant with respect to system ( 7 ) , i.e., let
On strategies of players. Like before, let the goal of the first player be to maximize the payoff function and let the task of the second one be to minimize it. Our payoff functions are
In the general case, without Isaacs's condition, the lower game value and the upper game value depend on choosing the formalization of strategies of players [30, Ch. XVI], [47, Subsect. 14], [5] . For simplicity, we now assume that the first player announces a nonanticipating strategy (see [15, 44, 45] ) and another, knowing it, selects an admissible measurable control. 
We denote by A the set of all nonanticipating strategies for the first player.
Now, for all T, λ > 0, we can define lower game values,
Constructing a game value map. Let us set
Let C be the set of all bounded maps from K to R ; this set satisfies ( 2a ) , and w λ , v T ,
λ,h ∈ C for each positive λ, T and natural h . For every map c ∈ C , we can consider the following value function:
It is easy prove that V : C → U satisfies ( 2b ) , ( 2c ) . Thus, we obtain the game value map V.
The dynamic programming principle with respect to nonanticipating strategies for Bolza functionals (particularly, for the payoffs v T ) is well-known, see [16, 47] . Such a principle for the payoff function w λ follows from [4, Theorem VIII.1.9]. All conditions of Theorem 2 verify.
we obtain Theorem 4 Let f, g be as before, and let a non-empty set X ⊂ R m be strongly invariant with respect to ( 7 ) .
Then, for a function U * : X → [0, 1] , U * is a limit of V T as T ↑ ∞ that is uniform in X iff U * is a limit of W λ as λ ↓ 0 that is uniform in X.
Under Isaacs's condition, this theorem was proved in [26] . A Auxiliary statements.
Assume a non-empty set C satisfies ( 2a ) and a game value map V : C → U enjoys ( 2b ) ,
.
Two estimates. Consider T > 0, r > 1 , and z ∈ K. Assume v T , v rT ∈ C . Now,
Consider λ > 0, r > 1 , and z ∈ K. Assume w λ , w rλ ∈ C . Now,
Thus,
On extension of V . Denote by C b the set of all bounded maps from K to R . Assume
Note that ( 2a ) holds for C b . Define a map V b : C b → U as follows:
Since, for all R ∈ R, c ∈ C , the inequality
is well-defined and bounded for every c
It is easy to prove that ( 2b ) and ( 2c ) hold for V b . In addition,
Thus, we have proved Lemma 1 Let a non-empty set C ⊂ C b satisfy ( 2a ) and a map V : C → U enjoy ( 2b ) and ( 2c ) . Then, the map V b : C b → U enjoys ( 2b ) and ( 2c ) and is an extension of V .
B
The proof of Proposition 1.
On simplicity of notation.
For all payoff functions c , let us also use the following notation:
For instance, for a function U * : Ω → R and ω ∈ Ω , the symbol [
for the payoff function K ∋ z → c(z) = U * (z(1)) ∈ R . The symbol [U * (z 1 (1))] ω also means the same for the same payoff. Moreover, the symbols
denote the value of the game value map for the payoff function
similarly to e.g. the equivalence of A f (x) B g(y)dydx and A f (r) B g(s)dsdr.
Auxiliary estimates. Recall that C b is the set of all bounded maps from K to R . Without loss of generality, we assume that C ⊂ C b ; otherwise, we could always use C ∩ C b instead of C.
Further, we can assume that C = C b ; otherwise, applying Lemma 1, we could always define V on C b \ C such that conditions ( 2b ) -( 2c ) keep to hold. Thus, we obtain the value V [c] for all bounded payoffs c :
Fix some positive ε < 1/4 . Applying 2ε ≤ ε 1/2 , we can choose some natural k ≥ 2 such
By the definitions of the subsolution and the supersolution, for each ε > 0 , there exists a positiveT such that, for all λ ∈ (0, 1/T ), ω ∈ Ω , and natural h >T , T >T + h ,
By ( 3a ) , there existsT > max{T ,
The special choice of λ . Fix every λ <
is a natural number; set
Observe that h , T = (k + 1)h, and T − h = kh are natural. It is easy to verify that p > 1 implies that ln p < p − 1 < p ln p . Then,
In particular, from the inequalities T = h(k + 1) > (k + 1)T and T − h ≥ h >T , it follows that T, h, λ satisfy ( 9 ) , ( 10 ) . Also, T λ =
Forward-tracking. For all ω ∈ Ω, from ( 9 ) it follows that
The inequality will still hold if we replace the symbol z inside the square brackets with e.g. z 1 .
We have
In particular, for all z ∈ K , we get
Substituting the corresponding part into ( 14 ) , we obtain
Repeating, we obtain
Proceeding in a similar way, for all n ∈ N , ω ∈ Ω , we obtain
. . .
Backtracking. Since U T is bounded, we can choose natural n such that
By the choice of p , we have
In addition, T λ ≥ 1 by ( 12 ) . Now, g ≥ 0 leads to
Recall that λ = ln p h by ( 11 ) . Also, thanks to ( 11 ) , we have pe −λt ≥ pe −λh = pq = 1 for all
Since V [w λ ] is a supersolution (see ( 10 ) ), in view of q = e −λh , we obtain
Proceeding in a similar way, we have
for all positive λ < Recall that, by the choice ofT , we havê T ln p ≥ 1. By the choice ofT and λ ′ , we obtain
First, thanks to ( 8b ) , we get
by the definition of κ and by the choice ofT and λ ′ , we get
Thus, we obtain
for all sufficiently small positive λ ′ . By arbitrariness of positive ε , the proof is complete.
C The proof of Proposition 2.
We will continue the notation of the previous section for values of the game value map V . For instance, the symbols . Choose natural n such that 2p −n < ε 1/2 . Now,
By ( 3b ) , there exists positiveT such that κ(λ, p) ≤ ε/2 holds for all positive λ < 1/T .
By the definitions of the subsolution and the supersolution, there exists positiveT >T such that, for all ω ∈ Ω , λ ∈ (0, 1/T ) and natural h >T , T > h +T , one has
Note that, for all λ ∈ (0, 1/T ) , U λ is bounded; then, e −λh 0 U λ < ε/2 for all sufficiently large natural h 0 . Now, ( 16 ) , ( 2c ) , and g ≤ 1 imply that U λ (ω) ≤ λ h 0 e −λt dt + ε ≤ 2 for all λ ∈ (0, 1/T ) .
The special choice of T . Fix every natural T > kp n+1T > kp n+1T such that T (k+1)
−n−1 is also natural. Then, T (1 − p −1 )p −n = T k n (k + 1) −n−1 is natural as well. Set
In view of p ln p > p − 1 > ln p , we also have
For all i ∈ {0, . . . , n}, the numbers hq i , (T − h)q i = khq i are natural; now, from (T − h)q i > hq i >T and λp i < 1/T it follows that λp i , hq i , T q i satisfy the inequalities ( 16 ) , ( 17 ) for all i ∈ {0, . . . , n} . Moreover, U p i+1 λ ≤ 2 holds for all i ∈ {0, . . . , n} .
Forward-tracking. By λ < 1/T < 1/T , for all ω ∈ Ω, we have 
